1969 Revulotion of Somalia

 21st October revulotion holds a historic place in Somalia's history.

On this day in 1969, the National Armed Forces seized power. The timing itself was significant—just five days after the assassination of the President of the Republic. The ruling political elites of the Somali Youth League (SYL), plagued by corruption, failed to elect a new president.  

The political deadlock was largely driven by disputes over clan affiliations. The main disagreement among politicians was about which clan the new president should come from.  

Some advocated for an open and fair election, while others insisted that the new president should be selected from the same clan as the slain former president. This deepened the crisis and ultimately led to the coup d'état.

More than half a century since gaining independence, Somalia's political landscape remains deeply troubled. Corruption has intensified, and the state's authority has been eroded by entrenched clan divisions. The actors undermining national unity have succeeded in fragmenting the country into dysfunctional enclaves, impeding governance and sustainable development.

Government's empty promis

 DO YOU GET IT TIGHT?

I DON'T IT

The Somali people have heard about the concept of "one person, one vote" elections, and the current Somali leaders often speak about it, regardless of their intentions.

The phrase "one person, one vote"  is not a bad one—it reflects a long-standing desire of the Somali people to directly express their vote. However, the Somali people do not fully understand the mechanisms required to achieve it. They are told that countries which experienced war, like Iraq and Afghanistan, have already held such elections.

But have they asked who conducted those elections? What was the underlying interest? And what became of the democratic outcomes in those countries?

In truth, the phrase "one person, one vote" is sweet like the flesh of a date, but bitter like its pit.

That is to say, the essence of one person one vote requires several conditions to legitimize its outcome:

1) Security and the possibility of transparent and equal participation  

2) An agreed-upon electoral environment.  

3) Independent and neutral electoral staff. 

4) A government that administers voting across all borders of the country. 

5) An official census and identification system to verify voter citizenship. 

6) Resources, skills, and infrastructure necessary to conduct nationwide elections, such as independent broadcasting, communication, logistics, etc.  

7) A fair judiciary trusted by both the public and the candidates  

When these points are compared to the current reality of the country—its fragmented population, the conflicts with Al-Shabaab and ISIS, etc.—it becomes clear that it is not feasible, within the remaining time of this administration and the current state structure, to claim that a nationwide, consensus-based election using the "one person, one vote" model can be held.

I personally do not understand what is meant by this claim.

Reflecting on Arta Peace Conference

 Only the ignorant celebrate the time and place where their dignity was buried.

Although critical analysis is not widespread among Somalis, I have observed voices on social media questioning the true intent behind the Carta Conference, which introduced the deeply flawed 4.5 clan power-sharing formula—four major clans and a "half" for minorities. One must ask: where did this concept of a “half clan” originate? What criteria was it based on, especially in the absence of a reliable census?

This formula has no precedent in global governance and was crafted by individuals regarded as Somali intellectuals—many of whom were aware of its harmful nature, yet still promoted it as a “solution.”

Now, 25 years later, the question remains: if it wasn’t a solution, what was it? I reflect on the age of the clan conflict at that time—it was barely nine years old. So how old and entrenched is it now, post-Carta? It becomes clear that the path chosen was misguided. At the time, there was no religious war, no foreign troops, and no externally imposed government. While the situation was far from ideal, Somalis still held ownership of their destiny.

Let us not pretend that warlords were the only issue then. Today, we face an even more troubling reality: a multitude of self-proclaimed presidents, enabled by the same flawed 4.5 system. Worse still, some of these leaders openly sell out the country—and are applauded for it.

This is not a critique of our Djiboutian brothers, but rather a reflection on how circumstances have evolved.

As for me, I believe the true solution lies in a unified Somali state—one government that represents all Somalis equally. Perhaps I am the one who fails to understand, having never embraced the revolving cast of factions and the ever-growing number of presidents.

The hope that Somalia will rise from its ashes lives in the collective consciousness of its people. However, this hope can only be realized through comprehensive reform—starting from Youth Awakening.